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Abstract—Cloud computing offers computational resources
such as processing, networking, and storage to customers. How-
ever, the cloud also brings with it security concerns which
affect both cloud consumers and providers. The Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) define the security concerns as the seven main
threats. This paper investigates how threat number one (malicious
activities performed in consumers’ virtual machines/VMs) can
affect the security of both consumers and providers. It proposes
logging solutions to mitigate risks associated with this threat. We
systematically design and implement a prototype of the proposed
logging solutions in an IaaS to record the history of customer
VM’s files. The proposed system can be modified in order to
record VMs’ process behaviour log files. These log files can
assist in identifying malicious activities (spamming) performed
in the VMs as an example of how the proposed solutions benefits
the provider side. The proposed system can record the log files
while having a smaller trusted computing base compared to
previous work. Thus, the logging solutions in this paper can assist
in mitigating risks associated with the CSA threats to benefit
consumers and providers.
Keywords—cloud monitoring; logging system; accountability;
I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud is attractive to many organizations because of
its flexibility and benefit of reducing IT costs [1]. It can
potentially transform the IT industry in a wide variety of
application areas and is the future of computing as argued
by many people [2]. [3], [4] point out that Infrastructure as
a service (IaaS) provides a base on which to build Platform
as a Service (PaaS) or Software as a Service (SaaS) offer-
ings. It is increasingly used in many areas (e.g., in medical
experiments [5], [6], [7]). However, trust of consumers in a
cloud is one of the main barriers for its continued proliferation.
Customers want to know how the cloud operate their data (e.g.,
who has access to it, and when it was accessed) as argued
by [8], [9], [10], [11]). The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
has published top threats to cloud computing report [12] that
relates to the security issues. This document is used in this
paper to provide the basic threats which this paper aims to
mitigate risks associated with these threats.
Research usually discusses the security in the cloud from
customer perspectives. However, the CSA publish Top Threats
Cloud Computing Survey 2012 [13] which includes both cloud
consumers (53%) and providers (30%) as the respondents. The
survey is a good example that research should consider the
threats to cloud from both customer and provider perspec-
tives. Thus, our study discusses mitigating the CSA threats for
both parties. Many researchers [2], [1], [14], [9], [8] argue that
a logging system is a significant aspect in any accountability
solutions to mitigate risks associated with the threats in the
cloud. A logging system composes of logging processes and
log files [8]. A logging process focuses on logging-related
tasks, and log files store contents produced by these processes.
However, works that propose log files for accountability ([2],
[1], [14], [9], [8]) do not clearly focus on the security of
both customers and providers. Additionally, they do not clearly
discuss how the log files’ contents could be, and how the
contents can mitigate the risks associated with threats to benefit
both customers and providers in detail.
This paper concerns the importance of customers’ critical
files, which is files in customers’ virtual machines/VMs disks,
and is valuable assets for their businesses such as databases
files, full detail in Section II-C. It also aims to provide
logging solutions to benefit both customers and providers.
In our previous work [8], we already summarized all seven
threats from CSA report [12]. Thus, this paper focuses on
and describes only threat 1 (abuse and nefarious use of cloud
computing), as an example of the cloud issues we tend to
provide the logging solutions to deal with. Forms of this threat
can be malicious customers use their VMs to attack other
customers’ VM or attack the provider’s hosting system/dom0
(which hosts all customer VMs), or spam activities in the VMs.
There are two types of log files in the cloud as discussed
in [10], [11]: file-centric logs and system-centric logs. The
first is tracing files from the time they are created to the
time they are deleted as discussed in [9], [10]. The later is
the hardware layer logs such as memory use, disk storage,
temperature, voltage, etc, as argued by [15]. It also can be event
logs, user account activity logs, processor usage, etc, as argued
by [11]. However, we focus on the file-centric logs. This is
because current research of logging in the cloud only focuses
on the system-centric logs [11], which is usually disclosed to
consumers as argued by [16]. Although [11], [17] consider file-
centric logs in their work which can benefit customers, they
do not make clear how the logs benefit providers. Thus, this
paper proposes solution regarding the file-centric logs and to
benefit both customer and provider sides.
Summary of Contributions: First, this paper provides an
in-depth analysis of how CSA threat 1 affects both customer
and provider security concerns simultaneously. The analysis
differs from previous work (e.g., [12], [8]), which concerning
security only from either customer or provider perspectives.
The value of the analysis is to provide a basis for what contents
that logging solutions need to collect as evidence to deal
with the threat. To benefit both customers and providers, the
knowledge of the log file contents facilitate provision of the
appropriate logging solutions to deal with the right problems.
Thus, this paper then proposes appropriate logging solutions to
produce the file-centric logs (above), which assist in mitigating
risks associated with the threat to benefit both sides.
Second, regarding the file-centric logs, and to benefit both
customer and provider sides, this paper designs, and imple-
ments a prototype of the proposed logging solutions. It then
discusses how the result from the prototype implementation
can be used to form log files to be used as evidence to mitigate
risks associated with threat 1. Third, the proposed system
can be an alternative approach to collect file-centric logs as
evidence to enhance accountability in IaaS by customer’s VM
memory introspection approach from the provider’s hosting
system. This approach yields smaller trusted computing base
compared to placing interceptors in the VMs as in previous
work [11] [17]. Work by [18], [19] can yield the same TCB
as our proposed system. However, they are not designed
to achieve history of critical files (e.g., information of who
accesses these files, full detail in Section IV-A1) and the
process behaviour log files (e.g., information of which file this
process reading, Section IV-B1) as demonstrated in this paper.
The design of the architecture is based on a generic
logging template (our previous work [8]) which can be used to
perform a systematic analysis of logging system security. [8]
also achieves recording VM’s malicious process behaviours.
However, it does not concern the history of critical files as done
by this paper. We also use the template to clarify the layout of
significant related components in IaaS such as the provider’s
hosting system/dom0, a VM, logging processes, log files, and
the critical files. The template facilitates to systematically
design and implement the proposed logging system, and to
compare the proposed system to previous work in term of TCB.
We use Xen to replicate IaaS cloud architecture for the
prototype implementation of the proposed logging system. It
is currently a virtualization layer of many cloud providers
(e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud or EC2 [20]) as argued
by [17], [21]. The first contribution is simultaneous analysis
of how threat 1 affects both customer and provider, and the
proposed logging solutions. For the analysis, we investigate
how customer VMs can attack other customer VMs, and attack
dom0 in detail. We observe exactly literature underestimates
the risks to the provider. Thus, we carefully analyse vulnerabil-
ities of the provider’s dom0 which may lead to compromising
dom0 itself, then, all the customer VMs hosted by this dom0.
For the proposed solutions, we then indicate how important of
customers’ critical files in VMs, and discuss the concepts of
history of critical files, and process behaviour log files. Then,
we discuss the content of both types of log files, and discuss
how these log files can assist in mitigating risks associated
with threat 1 to benefit both customer and provider sides.
To achieve the second contribution which is the design,
implementation, and discussion of a prototype of the proposed
solutions, we describe the proposed logging system architec-
ture to obtain the history of critical files based on the template.
Then we explain the prototype implementation, and discuss
how the result from the impartation can mitigate the risks
associated with threat 1. To achieve the last contribution which
is the proposed system can be an alternative technique that
yields smaller trusted computing base compared to previous
work, based on the related components of logging systems
from the template, we discuss how the proposed system can
Fig. 1. The IaaS architecture, from [8]
Fig. 2. The overall view of a generic logging template from [8], its IaaS
components (white boxes) and logging components (shaded colour, logging
process: P1-4, and log files: F1-4)).
achieve the log files we needs while yielding smaller TCB
compared to previous work [11], [17], [18], [19].
In this paper, Section II provides the background. Sec-
tion III discusses how threat 1 affects both customer and
provider. The proposed solutions and their prototype imple-
mentation are discussed in Section IV, V respectively. The
result and how to obtain it are in Section VI. Section VII
discusses how the result assist in mitigating the risks associated
with threat 1, and compares our proposed system with previous
work. Section VIII is the conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. IaaS Architecture
This IaaS architecture is based on the Xen system. The
provider side can be an organization that offers VMs to the
customer side. The customer side can rent the VMs and
remotely access them via the Internet. In Figure 1, hw is
short for hardware. It is a machine that works as a host
of a hypervisor and all guest operating systems (OSes). A
hypervisor is software that enables the machine to run more
than one guest OSes in parallel. Dom0 is a privileged domain
guest OS that is launched by the hypervisor during system
boot. It directly accesses the hw and manages domUs. A domU
is an unprivileged domain guest OS that runs on top of the
hypervisor. It is a VM and an example of an IaaS cloud product
that the providers offer to customers to purchase.
B. A Generic Logging Template for IaaS Cloud
Our previous work [8] provide this template. We use it
throughout this paper to facilitate in understating the layout of
logging system components in IaaS. In the template (Figure 2),
IaaS components include hw0, hypervisor, hwU, dom0, domU,
app0, appU, disk0, diskU, mem0, and memU. The first four
components were already discussed in Section II-A. Hw0 is
the same as hw in Figure 1, 0 indicates that it is managed and
owned by a provider. AppU and app0 are applications that
runs inside domU and dom0 respectively. Disk0 is a physical
disk of the hw0, and diskU is a virtual disk of a domU. Mem0
is a main memory of the hw0, and memU is a virtual main
memory of domU. P1-P4 are logging processes that perform
logging-related tasks. F1-F4 are log files that are used for
storing contents produced by the logging processes.
C. Customers’ Critical Files in DomUs
This paper defines critical files as files in diskUs that
are owned by customers (domU’s owners). These files can
be any file type, such as text, executable, or database
files. They are the customers’ asset and valuable for
their businesses. Thus, the customers do not want anyone
to access these files apart from themselves and their
authenticated users, and do not want loss or leakage of
the files. It would be very serious for any company if its
business adversaries can access its critical files (e.g., business
database files) [22]. Figure 3 shows the location of a critical
file (called f) in diskU within the template. Critical files can be
created inside domUs, or may be uploaded via the Internet by
customers from their local machines to diskUs in the cloud.
For EC2, customers upload files to domUs to run their sys-
tems; for example, in medical experiments [5], [6], [7]. In [5],
in order to more quickly find new drugs to heal new diseases,
a computer intensive scientific experiment can be conducted
in EC2. After EC2 domUs launched, all essential software, the
input files, and executable C program files are transferred to
the diskUs. Thus, all these files in diskUs are critical from
the point of view of the owner of these domUs. Figure 3
shows the location of a critical file (called f) in diskU. Thus,
one can clarify all components (logging components, IaaS
components, and this critical file) in one view. This view assists
us to analyse and find solutions to mitigate risks associated
with CSA threats regarding both providers and customers.
In Figure 3, the dot-arrow line virtually shows that Alice
Fig. 3. Illustration of a location of a critical file f in diskU
(the domU owner) accesses her critical file f using the appU.
However, forms of threat 1 (such as customer VMs attacker
others VMs, fully discussed in Section III) may allow attackers
to control this appU, and use it to access the file maliciously.
III. THREAT 1 AFFECTS A CUSTOMER AND PROVIDER
Some forms of attacks enclosed in threat 1 (e.g., criminals
use domUs to attack other domUs or dom0) can be critical.
This is because they can eventually cause CSA threat 5 (data
loss or leakage which may occur in domUs). This threat has
been ranked as top in order of severity by the recent CSA
reports [13], [22]. CSA state that the severity of this threat
can be a devastating impact on the damage to one’s business
brand and reputations, or loss of core intellectual property [12].
Thus, we provide an in-depth analysis of the impact threat 1
can have on both customers and providers simultaneously.
A. Effects on A Customer due to Threat 1
1) DomU attacks domU: [23] demonstrate how to use a
domU to extract the private keys of another domU in an
Xen-Cloud environment (e.g., EC2). CSA also argue that
domUs can host malicious software that has proven especially
effective in compromising critical private resources in cloud
environments [24]. Although they did not mention that the
critical private resource is belong to whom, it may have be-
longed to customers. Especially, [25] also argue that a business
competitor of a victim domU can use a malicious domU to
attack the victim domU. Then, the competitor may be able to
read private data or compromise the victim domU. Thus, domU
attacks domU can cause a serious effect on cloud customers
such as malicious access to, loss or leakage of (threat 5) the
customers’ critical files (e.g., database files).
2) DomU attacks dom0 and uses this dom0 to attack other
domUs: Virtualization vulnerabilities in Windows 2008 (the
hypervisor) allow domU running under the hypervisor to crash
the Windows 2008 host (dom0) [26]. Thus, a domU can control
dom0 and exploit the other domUs hosted on the same physical
machine [27]. After dom0 is compromised, attackers can get
control on the entire domUs [28]. Thus, they may obtain root
accounts of these domUs, log into them, access the domUs’
critical files (see Figure 3, and as discussed in Section II-C
above). If these files are the customers’ business databases, this
can be a very serious incident. [21] argue that as dom0 can
transparently read and write the memory content of the domU
using the management interface; thus, if dom0 is compromised
by attackers, they may use this interface to steal the valuable
information from any domU. It is also argued by [15] that
dom0 can access all data in diskUs. This can be a serious
security concern from the point of view of the customers.
B. Effects on Provider due to Threat 1
1) Criminals can use domUs to attack provider dom0:
Again, it can be crucial when dom0 is compromised because
then all domUs could be at risks [4]. [26] states that domUs can
attack the dom0 that hosts them. [29] state that this is because
of a difficulty in clarifying the borders between a dom0 and
domUs in the same physical machine with virtualization infras-
tructure. Thus, these unclear borders can be one of the attack
channels. Another channel can be vulnerabilities in dom0. An
example can be holes in the management consoles of dom0
that allow attackers to gain the root privileged in this dom0,
as argued by [21]. Moreover, after dom0 is compromised, it
can be used by attackers to monitor domUs, eavesdrop of
communications between domU and dom0, take control of all
domUs, and inject malware into domU images [30].
2) A number of criminals in providers’ cloud infrastructure
can affect providers’ business reputation: There are many
forms of attacks enclosed in threat 1 such as all the incidents
caused by threat 1 discussed in Section III-A. It seems that
theses incidents affect only customer security concerns. How-
ever, these incidents can also affect provider security concerns;
for example, allowing attackers to control dom0, and use
it to compromise all domUs. Then, attackers (especially the
competitors of the victim domUs) may access, lose, or leak
customers’ critical files (threat 5). Others forms of attacks
enclosed in threat 1 also can be domUs that host spamming
activities, or downloads for illegal software [12]. Thus, if the
customers know that a lot of criminals (or all mentioned forms
of attacks enclosed in threat 1) are inside the provider’s cloud
infrastructure, this can impact on the providers. The impacts
can be losing the provider’s business reputations (which can
be important for customers when deciding to buy cloud prod-
ucts [31]), or these attacks can be an indicator of vulnerabilities
in the provider infrastructure. Then, the customers may not
want to buy or rent the product from this provider.
IV. PROPOSED LOGGING SOLUTIONS TO MITIGATE RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH THREAT 1 TO BENEFIT BOTH SIDES
A. History of Critical Files to Mitigate Risks Associated with
Threat 1 for Both Sides
1) What is the history of critical files: As discussed in
the compromising of both domUs or dom0 in Section III,
either domUs or dom0 compromising may have the result of
undesired access to, or loss or leakage of, customers’ critical
files. Thus, we propose to have a history of each of these
critical files. This paper applies work by PASSXen [17] and HP
TrustCloud [9] to form the definition of the history of a critical
file. PASSXen is a system that can collect the information on
the creation, access, and destruction of a file in the domU.
TrustCloud is a framework to deal with the lack of trust in
the cloud. It has file-centric information on domUs that is
obtained by tracing domUs’ data and files since they were
created until deleted. Thus, the history of a critical file in
this paper is the information on the file since it was created,
until permanently deleted. Precisely, it is records of three
periods of a critical file’s life time: created, accessed, and
destroyed. This paper discusses only some information of the
periods accessed as discussed below.
If a critical file f is s.txt (in Figure 3), the content of history
of s.txt (as a log file) can be Table I. In the table, f nm is the
name of critical file (e.g., s.txt), p id (e.g., 4624) and p nm
(e.g., read) is the id and name of the process that accesses
this file respectively, and p ownId (e.g., 1002, Alice Id) is the
id of the owner of this process. Sections V, and VI discuss
how to obtain this information. The content of the table can
be more complex to provide more precise evidence, which will
be discussed in the discussion, Section VII, Discussion.
f nm p id p nm p ownId
s.txt 4624 read 1002(alice)
s.txt 4800 read 1003(bob)
TABLE I. THE CONTENT OF THE HISTORY OF CRITICAL FILE F
(S.TXT), ADAPTED FROM [11]
In the case of some incidents happening in domUs that
have negative effects on customers or providers, the history of
critical files can be used as evidence to clarify what happened
with these domUs. This evidence can be a clue to discover
what is going on inside the domUs that contain the critical files.
Section IV-A2, IV-A3, VII-A, VII-B discuss how to discover
the causes of the incidents. Consequently, the evidence should
mitigate risks associated with threat 1 (e.g., criminal domUs).
As a result, this should mitigate causes of negative impact on
both customer and provider companies such as brand damage,
as discussed in Section III-A, III-B.
2) The history of critical files to mitigate risks associated
with threat to benefit the customers: It would be useful if
we had a history of each of domU’s critical files to assist
in indicating, for example who has access to these files,
and which appU accesses them. The history information can
enhance accountability in the cloud and customers’ confidence.
For example for threat 1, when Alice domU is compromised
by attackers, then they may control appU to access her critical
file f (s.txt), as shown in Figure 3 (discussed in Section III-A).
The history of f (the information such as which appU accesses
s.txt, when, and by whom this appU belonged to) can be used
to clarify this undesired malicious incident by the attackers.
History of critical files could assist in analysing attacker
behaviours inside domUs. To analyse attacker behaviours,
Alice can check row 2 column 4 in Table I, and may discover
that someone else (Bob) accesses her critical file s.txt. The
content of the table can be more complex to provide more
precise evidence, which will be discussed in Section VII.
3) How the history of critical files helps providers to deal
with dom0 compromising : In Table I, when one discovers
that Bob has accessed Alice’s critical file s.txt, this can be
a trigger for the providers to be aware that their dom0 may
be compromised. To identify malicious Bob accurately, they
can conduct further investigation, for example, by pinpointing
Bob’s Id (p ownId, column 4), the appU name (p nm, column
1) he used to access s.txt, or s.txt file name. Then, they can
gather more necessary evidence. For example, this can be
achieved by recording Bob’s appU behaviours, as done in a
case study of [8], or monitoring this appU/domU for malicious
network traffic, as done in [18]. Thus, the history of critical
files can be of benefit the provider.
B. Process Behaviour Log Files to Assist in Mitigating Risks
Associated with Threat 1 to Benefit the Provider
1) What is a process behaviour log files: This paper uses
Linux processes as an example of processes in a domU,
and uses a process and command interchangeably. Actu-
ally, an appU (in the template) becomes one or more pro-
cesses/commands. This paper assumes that each appU becomes
only one process. The provenance collection in PASSXen
also has the creation, access, and destruction of processes
in domUs. However, this paper briefly discusses a process
behaviour log file as a record of some of the process’s
activities, such as the process name and id, a file name of
a file that this process has access to, and the owner id of
the process. For example, command ’cat addr.txt’ is when a
cat (concatenate) command in Linux is accessing the text file.
Table II can be an example of a cat process behaviour log
file. The content of the log of the cat can be the name of the
process (p nm, cat), the id of the process (p id, 4000), the
name of the file accessed by cat process, (f nm, addr.txt), and
the id of the owner of this process (p ownId). This log can be
different, depending on who (a provider, customer, or auditor)
wants it and what it is for. The table shows only the content
for the purpose of identifying a spam domU below.
p nm p id f nm p ownId
cat 4000 addr.txt 1002
TABLE II. A PROCESS BEHAVIOUR LOG FILE TO SHOW THE
MALICIOUS CAT COMMAND READING ADDR.TXT
2) Process behaviour log files to assist in mitigating risks
associated with spam activities: First, the providers may use
a network monitoring (as used in [18], [32]). The monitoring
in [18] can pinpoint which processes inside a domU are
responsible for malicious or heavy network traffic leaving the
domU. Second, the provider may discover the commands in
this domU that send emails (e.g., mail command in Linux).
To send email to a@b.c with subject as spam, the command
can be ’mail -s spam a@b.c’ [8]. Third, the providers record
behaviours of the mail command as evidence to identify
accurately this spam domU. We have already demonstrated
recording this mail command behaviours as a log file (by
capturing the subject and the victim’s email address parameter
of mail command above) in a domU in our previous work [8].
Lastly, we can take one step further from [8]. Mail command
to send spam emails can be ’mail -s subject $(cat addr.txt)’.
It sends emails to all victim addresses in addr.txt. Thus, this
command involves addr.txt (Table II, column 3). Hence, this
file could be very important evidence to identify these spam
activities. Section VII-B discusses an example of the complete
process behaviour log file to show the malicious mail and cat
command involving spam activities.
Thus, regarding addr.txt and when the providers have
already pinpointed the mail command that sends spam emails,
as demonstrated by [8], they can then combine capturing the
mail command malicious behaviours (in [8]) with the cat
command behaviour log file (in Table II, this command reading
addr.txt) as evidence to assist in identifying this spam domU.
Thus, process behaviour log files (e.g., the cat’s behaviour log)
can be useful to assist in accurately analysing and identifying
spam domUs in the providers’ IaaS cloud. Reducing a number
of criminal (spam) domUs should maintain the providers’
reputation. This is because customers may buy the cloud
product based on providers’ reputations [31].
V. THE PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
A. Aim of the Proposed Logging System
Figure 4 shows the context of a domU for this implementa-
tion. In the figure, Alice rents a Linux domU. She has a critical
file (s.txt) in diskU. Read application (in the rectangle in user
level) is an appU. The name ’read’ is the appU’s name and also
the process name of the appU. Alice can run this application
to read s.txt (the dot-arrow line) with root or her privilege.
read mem (the ellipse in memU) is the memory space of this
read appU/process. This memory space holds all information
we need to record. This information (as shown in row 1 of
Table I) is a file name of s.txt, a process Id (e.g., 4624) and
a process name of read appU (e.g., read), and an owner Id of
read process (e.g., 1002 which is Alice’s user Id in this domU).
Hence, the aim of the logging system in this implementation
is to record the history of critical files (only row 1 of Table I,
as discussed above), and then store them in a log file.
Fig. 4. The context of the domU in the implementation: a read appU, a
critical file (s.txt) in diskU, and read mem (in memU) as memory space of
read appU
B. System Architecture of the Logging Solutions
Figure 5 is the system architecture of the proposed logging
system which is based on the template (Figure 2). The main
components are logger, P1/libVMI [33], and F3 as a log file.
LibVMI is a C library that can read the memory space (read -
mem) in memU from domU. Step 1: the logger (in dom0 user
level) is an app0 that calls libVMI to access memU (step 2) to
get the information in read mem such as a file name of s.txt, as
discussed above. Step 3: the logger writes the information (as
shown in row 1 of Table I) into F3. This architecture is based
on the template. Thus, it can be used to analyse the security
of the proposed logging system before deployment. How the
Fig. 5. The system architecture of the proposed logging system
logger knows whether a file in a domU is critical or not:
in this prototype implementation, this paper does not discuss
how to manage the logger application. Thus, we assume that
the logger knows the critical file.
C. The Security Analysis of the Proposed Logging System
DomUs cannot tamper with the logging components in-
side dom0: our implementation deploy the logger and libVMI
in dom0, and the log files (F3) in hw0. The advantage of doing
this is that domUs cannot tamper with these components. In
contrast, when deploying the components inside domU, this
allow the owner of this domU to tamper with these compo-
nents, as argued by [11], [34], [8], [19]. However, deploying
the logging components in dom0 also need to consider the
other security aspects as discussed below. The solutions for
these security issues is out of the scope of this paper.
First, the security analysis of the log files: we use
the logging system architecture (Figure 5) as a tool for this
analysing. For example, the security relevant question is how
to ensure the integrity of the log files that are stored in disk0
which are fully owned and controlled by a provider. The
provider may maliciously learn about, or alter the log files.
Second, the security analysis of logging processes: the next
security relevant question is how can an auditor ensures the
integrity of the logger or libVMI, which is run by the provider
in dom0. Locating these components in this location can be
a security risk. This is because the provider may maliciously
modify the logger’s code to produce contents of log files which
benefit himself. We discuss only the questions above as an
example of the analysis of the proposed logging system.
VI. THE RESULT AND HOW TO OBTAIN IT
A. The Result
In Figure 5, the logger command (app0) runs in dom0
(the 1st line in Figure 6). It keeps checking memU until read
command is performed and existed in memU. When read
command is performed in domU (the 1st line in Figure 7),
the logger then keeps waiting until the read command reads
s.txt. When the read command starts reading s.txt (the 2nd
line in Figure 7), the logger immediately extracts necessary
information (2nd line of Figure 6). These information are the
file name (s.txt), read process name (read), process id (4624),
and the id of the owner of read command (1002). After that,
the logger writes this extracted information to F3.
Fig. 6. The logger running in dom0 to record history of critical file s.txt
Fig. 7. The read command running in domU and reading critical file s.txt
B. How to Obtain the Result
To obtain a critical file name (s.txt), Figure 8 shows the
detail of *files point. Step 1 in Figure 8, *files is a pointer of
read process’s task struct that points to files struct structure. It
contains an fdt pointer that points to the first open file or fd[0]
inside fdtable structure, step 2. Each fd[i] points to each open
file that is opened by read process, step 3-4. It is assumed that
read process is reading s.txt which is pointed by fd[3], step
4. Figure 9 shows how, after the logger locates fd[3] pointer
(step 4), that logger obtains the file name (string s.txt). Step
1, the logger finds f path field (inside file structure), which is
a path structure. This structure contains a dentry pointer which
points to dentry structure, step 2. Dentry contains d name that
is a qstr structure (step 3) which has the name pointer field
that points to string s.txt, step 4.
Fig. 8. Detail of files pointer (of read process’s task struct) pointing to s.txt
Fig. 9. How the logger obtains the file name of a critical file s.txt
VII. DISCUSSION
The logger (Figure 5) can record the result as in line 2
of Figure 6. However, this section discusses how the logger
can be modified to produce many types of log files, which
assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit
both customers and providers. This section then compares the
proposed system with previous work, and discusses privacy
and confidentiality concerns of both sides due to the log files.
A. Forming a Complete History of Critical Files from the
Results to Mitigate Risks Associated with Threat 1 to Benefit
the Customers
1) Analysing malicious incidents when Alice is a single
user in a domU: In the experiment, the domU is for a single
user. However, Alice owns two accounts: the root (can run all
appUs in the domU) and alice (an administrator). An example
of the complete content of history of s.txt (Table III) can
be constructed from the result (2nd line of Figure 6). Note
that, last acc (column 5) presents the last accessed times of
the file. The asterisks (*) in the following tables indicate
possible malicious events in domUs. When the history of s.txt
f nm p id p nm p ownId last acc
s.txt 4624 read 1002 t1
s.txt 4002 read 1002 *t2
s.txt 4003 *maliciousRead 1002 t3
s.txt 4004 read *1003 t4
TABLE III. AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMPLETE CONTENT OF THE
HISTORY OF S.TXT
is available to Alice, she may audit s.txt. For example, row
1 can be a normal event when Alice logs in to her domU.
Then, she runs her read appU (p nm) to access s.txt (f nm,
the dot-arrow line in Figure 4) with her or root permission.
The history of s.txt (Table III) shows Alice’s Id (1002)
in column 4. In the case root’s or Alice’s password is
compromised, which may be caused by threat 1, row 2-3
can be suspect incidents relate to her file. Row 2 can be
undesired access to s.txt. The reason can be that Alice has
never accessed s.txt at t2 time (column 5). Thus, she may
suspect that attackers may have accessed s.txt. Another case
in row 3: Alice has never used maliciousRead appU (column
3) to access s.txt. Thus, she may also suspect that attackers
may be doing this. After pinpointing maliciousRead, in order
to obtain more evidence for auditing, she may make further
investigations using other methods (e.g., network monitoring
as used in [18], [32]).
2) Analysing malicious incidents when Alice is in a multiple
users domU: The domU in this implementation can be used by
multiple users. Thus, Alice’s domU have a root user, Alice (an
administrator), and Bob (a standard user, who shares and can
log in to Alice’s domU). As discussed in Section III-A, this
domU can be compromised by threat 1. Thus, attackers may
obtain both Bob’s and root’s password. Then, they may log
in to Alice’s domU using Bob’s account. Thus, they can run
Alice’s read appU (with root permission) to access s.txt. Thus,
the evidence can be row 4 of Table III. This row can be a
suspect incident that why and how Bob (id 1003, in column
4 row 4) accesses Alice’s s.txt. Although the attacker uses
the same appU (read, in column 3 row 4) which is normally
used by Alice to access s.txt, the log (from our experiment)
still shows Bob’s Id (1003), which is not an owner of s.txt.
Consequently, Alice could eventually discover this suspicion
from the history of s.txt. Thus, the history information in
Table III can be evidence to assist in analysing undesired
incidents inside domUs. As a result, this can mitigate risks
associated with threat 1 to benefit customers.
3) Another type of log files: To enhance flexibility of
auditing in the cloud using logging systems, the logger can be
modified. For example, an auditor may want to know whether
a particular appU (as one that has an ability to view text files
e.g., gedit in Linux) read s.txt or not. Thus, it is possible
to modify the logger to record the history of this particular
process instead of history of s.txt. Thus, this type of log file
could be as in Table IV, which shows a list of all files that
were accessed by gedit. Then, the auditor can check whether
this process reads s.txt or not. In the table, the auditor can see
that gedit reads s.txt (row 2 column 3). Thus, this type of log
files can be useful to enable flexibility of the auditing.
p nm p id to file nm p ownId
gedit 4000 a.txt 1002
gedit 4003 *s.txt 1002
TABLE IV. A LIST OF ALL FILES ACCESSED BY GEDIT APPU
B. How the Result Assists in Mitigating Risks Associated with
Threat 1 to Benefit the Providers
For dealing with the compromising of dom0, as discussed
in Section IV-A3 that history of critical files (Table I) can be
evidence for the providers to be aware that their cloud infras-
tructure may be compromised. From Table III, maliciousRead
appU used by Bob (row 3, column 3) can be used as a trigger
or pinpoint for the providers to make further investigations.
For dealing with spamming, to record the command ’mail -
s subject $(cat addr.txt), Table V shows that both malicious
mail (column 1) and cat (column 2) command involving spam
activities. One can see that this domU owner (id 1002, column
4 and 5) uses the combination of both commands to send spam
emails, cat to read addr.txt (column 3) and then mail to send
emails to all the victim addresses in addr.txt.
p nm1 p nm2 f nm1 p ownId1 p ownId2
mail cat addr.txt 1002 1002
TABLE V. A PROCESS BEHAVIOUR LOG FILE TO SHOW THE
MALICIOUS MAIL AND CAT COMMAND INVOLVING SPAM ACTIVITIES
C. Related Work and Comparisons
Our proposed logging system architecture (Figure 5) de-
ploys libVMI (previously known as XenAccess [19]). LibVMI
is based on six high level requirements of programming
guidelines or good security guidelines [19]. Our proposed
system architecture inherits these requirements while achiev-
ing the history of critical files. The first two requirements
are: no superfluous modifications to the hypervisor, and no
modifications to domUs. These requirements involve a trusted
computing base (TCB) which is a significant factor when
building logging systems in the cloud. This is because in
order to evaluate the trustworthiness of a software system (e.g.,
our proposed logging system), it is necessary to identify its
TCB [35]. Thus, the size of the TCB should be as small as
possible [19]. However, [36] points out that an OS is difficult to
analyse because of its size and complexity. He also argues that
there is too much TCB when deploying an application in an OS
(e.g., domUs) that is running on top of a hypervisor. [37] argue
that an OS code changes rapidly over time. The changes may
increase the size of the OS and its complexity, and as a result,
its TCB. Thus, the TCB can be a very important aspect of
security, in order to propose logging systems in the cloud. For
example, the proposed systems in [36], [35], [19], [38] (that
can be considered as solutions to mitigate risks associated with
the cloud problem) concern reducing the TCB size along with
their proposed systems. Recent work that extensively relates to
a secure cloud computing environment such as that of [39] also
focuses on reducing the TCB in their proposed architecture.
Thus, this section discusses related work that involves
logging or detecting mechanism in an IaaS. It also compares
the logging system in this paper with those in related work
based on TCB and achieving a history of critical files. First,
Flogger [11] and PASSXen [17] can provide a history of
critical files. However, Flogger has logging processes that are
distributed across domU and dom0. PASSXen also has logging
processes that are distributed across the hypervisor, domU and
dom0. Therefore, the proposed architecture in this paper yields
less TCB than Flogger and PASSXen. This is because the
TCB of our architecture includes only hypervisor and dom0,
not domU, whereas their TCB includes domU. Second, [18]
propose a network monitoring application that identifies which
process inside a Windows domU is responsible for mali-
cious network traffic leaving this domU. Additionally, [19])
present a demo monitoring program in dom0 that outputs
all file/directory creation/removals happening in domU’s /root
directory. Both works deploy XenAccess in dom0. Thus, these
systems have small TCB (hw0, Xen, and dom0) the same as
the proposed architecture in this paper. However, they are not
designed to achieve a history of critical files, but could be
modified to add this functionality.
D. Privacy and Confidentiality Concerns of Customers and
Providers due to the Log Files
The history of critical files and process behaviours log files
discussed in this paper is detailed records of activities of pro-
cesses and files in a customer VM. For auditing purposes, this
history information can be investigated by a third party. Thus,
this information may disclose customer business activities, or
malicious activities inside provider’s cloud infrastructure. This
leads to privacy and confidentiality issues of both customers
and providers. However, [14] argue the privacy issues is
manageable. For example, it is important to consider what is
being recorded, and who can access this recorded information.
Thus, logging system management should return the recorded
information at different levels of detail, depending on who
needs it. To address the privacy and confidentiality issues, this
may lead to further research such as balancing the privacy and
its usage (e.g., [40]). This is out of the scope of this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We argue that Cloud Security Alliance/CSA threat 1 (re-
lated to criminal activities in customers’ VMs such as spam-
ming) can have serious effects for both provider and customer
sides. The examples are compromising provider’s hosting sys-
tem/dom0, consequently, customer virtual machines. The paper
then proposes, implements, and discusses logging solutions to
mitigate risks associated with threat 1 in infrastructure as a
service (IaaS) cloud. We argue that our result can be used
to form log files called history of critical files and process
behaviour log files. We then demonstrate in detail how these
log files can mitigate the risks to benefit both sides. To
collect the log files, our proposed system yields smaller trusted
computing base (TCB) compared to previous work [11], [17].
Although, work by [18], [19] can yield the same TCB as our
proposed system. However, they are not designed to achieve
the history of critical files as discussed in this paper. When
we have the full implementation of the proposed system, it
should be an appropriate point to have the evaluation of the
system performance impact or the scalability. However, history
of critical files and process behaviour log in this paper can be
important evidence to clarify what is going on in the cloud.
Thus, these log files assist in enhancing the accountability in
the cloud, consequently, assist in mitigating risks associated
with CSA threats to benefit both consumers and providers.
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